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Employment	and	fiscal	effects	of	investing	in	universal	
childcare:	a	macro‐micro	simulation	analysis	for	the	
UK	
 
Jerome De Henau1 
March 2019 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the macro-micro linkages between paid and unpaid work, and their fiscal 
implications, following investment in a public system of universal childcare for all preschool children. 
Taking the UK as an example of expensive and inadequate childcare provision of uneven quality, the 
objective of the paper is to show the extent to which large-scale investment in childcare as a form of 
social infrastructure, often overlooked by policy-makers and economists in their conceptualisation of 
‘investment’, is beneficial to society. It benefits children by improving their access to high quality 
early education, especially those living in lower income families, and thus improving their life 
chances and social inclusion. It has larger short-term employment effects than corresponding 
investment in less labour-intensive industries such as construction; and it fosters gender equality in 
employment by not only providing many high-quality jobs for women but also allowing many 
mothers to realise their full potential by freeing up their childcare constraints (and improve their 
lifetime earnings prospects). 
 
The paper estimates the gross cost for central government of investing in universal full-time full-year 
childcare with highly qualified and well paid staff using different benchmark scenarios for current pay 
and qualification levels. It then examines labour demand and supply effects from a gender 
perspective. Not only childcare investment increases demand for direct and indirect jobs which can be 
estimated, it also changes the labour supply characteristics of potential candidates as it reduces the 
budget constraints of carers. Estimations of increased employment and corresponding household 
income are performed so that tax liabilities and benefit entitlements can be calculated on aggregate to 
analyse fiscal sustainability considerations. Results show that the net annual funding requirement 
would only amount to 25% of the gross investment, given behavioural effects on employment and 
consumption, and thus tax revenue. Moreover, we estimate a fiscal break-even point of the minimum 
number of years required of increased maternal employment and earnings to yield sufficient tax 
revenue that recoups the total childcare cost. Results show that if mothers of young children can 
regain their prior level of earnings (ie are not subjected to a child penalty) then the number of years of 
gainful employment needed before the policy breaks even fiscally ranges between 7 and 13 years for a 
typical mother of two children in childcare, which is well within a typical working life-course. 
 
  
                                                            
1 Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Open University, UK. Contact: j.de-henau@open.ac.uk  
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Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the employment and fiscal effects of investing in free universal 
childcare provision for pre-school children as one of the bedrocks of the social infrastructure 
that is currently deficient in the UK and in many other OECD countries (OECD, 2017). 
Social infrastructure – the delivery of services of care, health and education – is essential to 
achieve a sustainable economy and as such needs to be properly funded (De Henau et al., 
2016; Ilkkaracan, 2017; Elson, 2017). Recent governments across the developed world, 
reacting to the crisis in public finances in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash were 
prompt to cut many public services that form part of the social infrastructure without 
effective replacement of equivalent quality in the private or voluntary sector. Moreover, 
many of these services were lacking the level of accessibility, affordability and quality, in 
particular care services, that the economy required, even prior the crisis (Bargawi et al., 
2017). 
 
The race to reducing public deficits seems to have slowed down, at least in the UK, with talks 
about significant borrowing for public investment; however the uncertainty brought about by 
a constantly changing economic and political landscape requires exploring alternatives to 
existing investment policies urgently. In particular examining the case of investing in social 
infrastructure seems crucial in the current context of state retrenchment and stagnating wages. 
We examine the idea that investing sufficient funds for providing all children with adequate 
childcare of high quality, free for their parents at the point of use and regardless of their 
circumstances, would go a long way to solve current gender and social inequalities, 
underemployment, low pay and low productivity without draining public finances.   
 
This paper explains in detail the method used to calculate the initial cost of providing 
universal childcare according to different mixes of staff pay and qualification levels. It then 
looks at the aggregate employment effects of labour demand and supply. We use standard 
input-output methods to derive not only indirect but also induced employment effects from 
increased household consumption and discuss the particularities of such investment in 
relieving some of the constraints the carers face to finding decent full-time employment 
should they wish to. By potentially increasing labour supply as well as labour demand, such 
investment, unlike say an investment of equivalent magnitude in physical infrastructure, may 
be more efficient in achieving full employment, especially in a context of low unemployment 
but high underemployment (especially for women). The fiscal impact of increased 
employment and improved working conditions, especially among mothers of young children, 
is discussed and estimated in the short and longer term, looking in particular at income tax 
increases from additional earnings generated by new full-time jobs, increases in consumption 
and thus indirect expenditure taxes, and reduction of social security spending on means-tested 
benefits such as Universal Credit. 
 
The next section makes a brief case in favour of universal childcare of high quality and why 
it would address the issues specific to the various systems of funding in the UK. It is then 
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followed by a section outlining the conceptual framework of how investing in childcare 
services would increase employment and fiscal revenue. The section that follows delves in 
more detail into the costing method to estimate annual funding requirement of childcare 
provision in different configurations. Then we look at the short-term employment effects 
from both the demand and the supply side including gender effects. Following this, fiscal 
considerations are examined, in particular an estimation of the tax revenue from increased 
employment and reduced social security spending, to assess the fiscal viability of the 
investment without the need to raise additional taxes. The final section concludes. 
 
Making the case for free universal preschool childcare 
 
A large pool of research findings have shown that lack of affordable and accessible childcare 
provision is associated with lasting negative effects on gender inequalities over the life course 
(see reviews in De Henau et al, 2007a and b; De Henau and Himmelweit, 2013; Ilkkaracan et 
al., 2015). Moreover, access to formal childcare of high quality for a significant number of 
hours during the week is crucial to improving children’s outcomes and life chances, even for 
very young toddlers and infants, especially those from more disadvantaged backgrounds 
(Dearing et al., 2015; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011 and 2014; Karoly et al., 2005, Babchishin 
et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013; Bauchmüller et al., 2014; see also Huston et al., 2015, and Van 
Lancker, 2013, for a fuller discussion). 
 
Yet despite successive government intervention in the sector, childcare provision in the UK is 
still largely inaccessible and unaffordable to many parents, and of uneven quality (De Henau 
et al., 2007a; Harding et al., 2017). The cost to parents is very high in the UK compared to its 
European neighbours and cost rises have been outstripping general inflation over the last 
fifteen years (Harding and Cottel, 2018; Butler and Rutter, 2016). Reports analysing UK 
childcare provision also point to the lack of places for young children, even among private 
providers. State support necessary to make a childcare system viable is currently too low or 
inadequate (Harding and Cottel, 2018; Harding et al. 2017; Cory, 2017).  The system consists 
of a complex mix of direct subsidies to providers, tax breaks for families and cash support to 
low income families. In 2015, public subsidies to providers to offer free childcare for 3-4 
year olds (and disadvantaged 2 year olds) only covered for 15 hours a week and for 38 weeks 
of the year.2 Moreover, the payment to providers per hour of childcare is below their supply 
cost. This leads them to recoup the shortfall by raising fees for hours purchased by parents, 
increasing the already high costs of UK childcare yet further. Since 2017 the increase to 30h 
of free childcare for working parents risk compounding this problem as funding remains 
inadequate (Cory, 2017). In addition, a complex system of means-tested cash transfers (tax 
credits) to families with children, including subsidies to pay for childcare expenses, leads to 
heavy costs being born by second earners if they work more than short part-time weeks. 
Despite these forms of support targeted at disadvantaged families, the UK system is 
characterised by high levels of inequality in use, partly driven by its high costs, even when 
                                                            
2 This is effectively equivalent to 10h of parental opportunity to take employment if 48 working weeks per 
annum (p.a.) and commuting time are to be accounted for. 
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subsidised. Van Lancker (2013) calculated using EU-SILC data for 2009 on FTE childcare 
use by household income quintiles that children under 3 in the 20% highest income families 
were six times more likely than those in the bottom 20% to be in formal childcare, compared 
to just 50% more likely in Germany, Belgium and Italy and 20% in Denmark and Sweden. 
 
One solution that has been suggested is to invest on a broad scale in free full-time formal 
childcare for all children, with highly trained and well paid staff, akin to a system of free 
universal school education (De Henau et al. 2007a; Ben-Galim, 2011; Mohun Himmelweit et 
al., 2014; Butler and Rutter, 2016). This paper looks at the costing and funding possibilities 
of such investment for children aged between 6 months and 4.5 years of age (when they enter 
primary school) in the UK. Attempts at costing universal provision have been carried out 
before, albeit on smaller scales. For example a study by the New Economics Foundation in 
2014 looked at various scenarios (pay and qualification) of childcare provision for children 
aged 6 months to three years in England (Mohun Himmelweit et al., 2014). This paper 
extends the scope of the NEF study by looking at all pre-school children and for the whole of 
the UK; it uses similar assumptions with respect to the qualification level of the staff and 
their pay. However it diverges about the composition and needs of group-based facilities, and 
uses instead results from the government’s own assessment of existing childcare cost 
structure which were derived for calculating current levels of state subsidy (Department for 
Education, 2015). Ben-Galim, 2011, investigated universal provision and fiscal effects from 
maternal labour supply but does not estimate costings and employment effects of improving 
quality standards. Butler and Rutter (2016) proposed a more modest 15h universal childcare 
for all 2-4 year-olds, extended to 30h for those with working parents and additional 
subsidised hours for working parents with means-tested fees but did not examine employment 
and fiscal effects. By contrast, Ilkkaracan et al. (2015) examined the case of extending 
childcare provision of high quality in Turkey, albeit not to reach universal coverage. 
However they complemented their direct costing exercise with estimations of employment 
and fiscal effects. 
 
This paper combines and extends these previous studies in a number of ways. It adds 
essential dimensions to understand a fuller short-term economic costing, firstly by looking at 
the wider employment effects, through indirect and induced employment job creation and, 
secondly by estimating fiscal revenue generated, not just from income and expenditure taxes 
but also from interactions with the means-tested benefit system. It also provides estimations 
of a longitudinal fiscal recoup stemming from increased earnings of mothers. 
 
Overview of the conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework is relatively straightforward. We aim for costing free and 
universal childcare provision, covering all children aged six months to primary school age on 
a full-time basis. The model also caters for scenarios involving higher qualification and pay 
for childcare staff not only because high quality provision improves children’s development 
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but also because it makes it more attractive for parents and thus potentially changes labour 
supply effects (Huston et al., 2015). 
 
Employment will not only be directly created in the childcare industry but also in the wider 
economy, in the supply chain of the childcare industry – known as indirect employment – and 
as a result of increased consumption by the newly employed people, creating induced effects 
(De Henau et al., 2016). Ilkkaracan et al. (2015) only looked at direct and indirect 
employment effects. 
 
In allocating jobs to potential candidates, the model also changes the pool of employable 
people. The jobs created will be taken by some people not currently in employment as well as 
some currently employed part-time, taking into account that their set of constraints and 
characteristics may be affected by the investment. Ilkkaracan et al. (2015) recognized this by 
allowing the pool of employable people to extend to people out of the labour force with 
caring responsibilities but the results of their allocation estimation procedure showed low 
likelihood of them being picked up partly because their specification didn’t allow for changes 
in caring constraints. However they separately estimated changing labour supply for low 
income mothers, independently of the labour demand effects, which reinforces the rationale 
that both should be considered together as argued by De Henau and Himmelweit (2016). 
 
In this paper more specifically, the framework allows for the pool of employable people 
considered for the job allocation to be extended to those: 
- whose childcare constraints (in time and money) were too high for them to supply 
their labour (mainly mothers of young children), and are now entirely alleviated by 
the free full-time childcare provision 
- whose qualifications were too low and can now be upskilled by the programme since 
the investment in childcare includes provision for training. 
 
Among those parents with young children already in employment, the reform may have two 
contradictory effects: an income effect of reducing working hours for those who only worked 
longer in order to afford the expensive childcare, and a substitution effect of increasing 
working hours for those currently working part-time because of childcare constraints (so 
these could be added to the ‘employable pool in search of the new full-time jobs). 
 
The job allocation process determines which households gain new employment (or longer 
hours) and thus higher earnings and how it affects their spending pattern. On average, 
households with members whose earnings have increased will increase their expenditure on 
the domestic economy. This will boost aggregate demand and generate induced employment.  
 
From these combined effects, fiscal revenue can be estimated from three main sources: 
- additional income tax and social security contributions of the newly employed people 
(and their employer); 
- expenditure taxes from increased consumption in the domestic economy; 
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- reduced social security spending on those who were out of job or on low income (eg 
unemployment benefits and tax credits for low-income families with young children). 
 
 
Calculating the direct costs of free delivery of full-time universal childcare 
 
The model of childcare provision considered here entails a typical facility that is group-based 
(crèche, nursery or kindergarten) attended by children of different age groups. This is indeed 
the dominant form of childcare provision used by parents in the UK (Department for 
Education, 2015). Following an integrated model found in Denmark and Sweden, it also 
helps prepare children socialise and develop skills to smoothen the transition to primary 
school (De Henau et al., 2007a; Datta-Gupta and Simonsen, 2007). 
 
In such type of facility, the annual amount to invest in childcare provision for all pre-school 
children depends on three main parameters: 
1. Coverage and opening hours (number of children to be offered a place and 
opening hours) 
2. Staffing requirements, in particular: 
o Ratio of number of children per staff, which typically varies with the child’s 
age 
o Non-contact time of staff (for training and admin work) 
o Level of remuneration and qualification of staff (including cost of initial 
training and on-costs for pension provision, holiday pay and social security 
contributions) 
3. Non-staff costs (overhead), including building costs (construction / rent / 
maintenance). 
 
Coverage and opening hours 
 
This model of universal provision assumes that a place is offered to all children from the age 
of six months3 to the age at which they enter primary school, on average 4.5 years of age in 
the UK. This would significantly extend current provision, especially for children under 3, as 
only about 30% of 0-2 year-olds used formal childcare in 2015, on average for 15h (Eurostat, 
2017). Although older children are enrolled at much higher rates, the average number of 
hours they attend facilities was also low at about 20h in 2015, compared to over 30h in the 
rest of the EU (Eurostat, 2017).  
 
Opening hours may vary and on average current commercial facilities are providing up to 35h 
of childcare per week, year-round (compared to the voluntary sector that provides about 30h 
but with facilities usually only opening during school term, that is 38 weeks a year). The 
                                                            
3 The choice of starting the provision at six months implies a shorter maternity/paternity leave than currently 
available in the UK, more in line with other western European countries but still above the EU minimum of 14 
weeks. 
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model here instead assumes coverage for children of any age for a full-time equivalent week 
of work, accounting for commuting time of one hour per day. A full-time working week is 
assumed to be 35 hours in this model, as it represents the average working time of women 
who were employed full-time in 2014 (ONS, 2017). 4  Hence childcare opening hours are set 
to 40h per week in the model. Childcare provision is also assumed to be available for 48 
weeks per year, allowing for a conservative 4-week holiday period taken between parents. 
The facilities may open year-round but the free provision is costed for 48 weeks. These 
assumptions differ somewhat from the current political debate. For example, around the 2017 
general elections, the Labour Party manifesto offered the most ambitious move towards 
universal provision, with free 15 hours for all children aged 2 and above, extended to 30h for 
working parents, and subsidised hours (low capped means-tested fee) for those wanting 
additional hours and for younger children. This proposal was largely based on a report by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation devising an anti-poverty system of subsidised childcare (Butler 
and Rutter, 2016). Other parties offered variations of a much less universal or generous 
system (BBC, 2017). However the model presented here follows a rationale of costing upper 
bounds of public investment un universal childcare and their effect on the economy; it can be 
adapted to provide fewer hours or to limit subsidised hours to some families on lower income 
for example, but limiting accessibility by employment conditions and subsidies by income 
levels creates other incentive issues, as well as administrative frictions that are difficult to 
model and not necessarily desirable. In effect, the rationale we are following is to extend to 
younger ages the current model of universal public education that is thus free at the point of 
use. 
 
Staffing requirements 
 
As childcare provision is a labour-intensive service, staff costs are the largest contributor to 
total running costs. The number of staff required per facility is determined by the regulatory 
child/staff ratios for each child’s age group. These statutory ratios differ between countries 
but are typically lower the younger the child. Most facilities in England currently provide 
more staff per child than what statutory ratios require. The reason for this put forward by 
providers is that extra staffing is needed to cover not just for sickness and breaks but also to 
deal with specific needs (social or physical) of some children that could take significant staff 
time away from the group (Department for Education, 2015). Table 1 shows the different 
ratios by age group and the distribution of children by centre. Current centres catering for 
preschool children (using commercial facilities as benchmark) have an average of 49 places 
available. Our model assumes similar total capacity of centres although with a different age 
mix since current facilities have fewer younger children attending. The modelled age mix 
represents the age mix under universal provision (last column of Table 1). 
 
                                                            
4 Note that by taking the women’s average as reference instead of the overall average, the model implies a 
shorter working week for all. This does not mean that the system is intended to portray childcare as a woman’s 
issue that needs to fit around women’s typical hours; instead it suggests a change in the working time norm for 
men, so as to promote more time for them to get involved in caring activities (see De Henau and Himmelweit, 
2013, for a discussion). 
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Table 1 child/staff ratio and distribution of age groups per centre 
  Child / staff ratio Distrib. of age group 
  Current Statutory Current Universal 
6 month- & 1 year-olds 2.5 3 20% 37%
2 year-olds 3.2 4 32% 28%
3 & 4 year-olds 6 8 49% 38%
Source: Department for Education (2015), ONS (2014a) and own model 
 
Staff in the new settings are assumed to work 35h a week following the model’s full-time 
working hours norm. This includes contact time with children as well as non-contact time to 
deal with administrative matters and other business (training, parents, social services). Non-
contact time is estimated to be 16% of staff working time (averaged across both supervisory 
and non-supervisory staff, that is staff on higher and lower qualification respectively) and is 
used in our model setting. 
 
Table 2 shows the current mix of qualifications found in existing (commercial and voluntary) 
facilities and their corresponding hourly wage rate (using 2014 data). It shows (first column) 
that the vast majority of staff is currently qualified at A-level (58%) (upper secondary school) 
and very few childcare workers have at least a university undergraduate degree (14%). By 
contrast the scenario of a high quality universal provision assumes a different mix (second 
column). In such a scenario, only two levels of qualification are considered: it is assumed that 
supervisory staff (which on average account for 45% of childcare workers across age groups 
in a typical facility according to regulatory ratios) are at a graduate level of qualification 
(level 6 – Bachelor’s degree) while all remaining non-supervisory staff are at least at level 3 
(A-level – upper secondary school). 
 
Table 2 Distribution of qualification levels and staff gross pay by centre (2014 prices) 
 
% of qual. 
staff 
% of qual. 
staff 
 £ hourly 
pay 
£ hourly 
pay 
 High Current  Teacher Current 
No qualif. 0% 4%  10.72 6.10 
Level 1 0% 0%  10.72 6.10 
Level 2 0% 6%  11.77 6.70 
Level 3 (A-level) 55% 58%  14.06 8.00 
Level 4 0% 10%  16.52 9.40 
Level 5 0% 7%  16.69 9.50 
Level 6 (Degree) 45% 12%  18.80 10.70 
Level 7 0% 2%  23.55 13.40 
Level 8 0% 0%  18.98 10.80 
Source: Department for Education (2015; 2014) and own model. A-level is roughly equivalent to upper 
secondary school qualification. ‘Teacher’ stands for a pay scale based on primary schools pay structure. 
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Table 2 also shows two different hourly pay scales that are considered in the model. The 
‘current’ pay scale shows that staff at lower levels of qualification are paid on average at the 
2014 National Minimum Wage (last column).  
 
A second pay scale entails a more generous package for each qualification than current wages 
(second to last column). This is based on the pay scale of primary school teachers, using 
similar pay levels for equivalent qualifications: as such level 6 childcare workers would be 
paid £18.80 an hour because it is the corresponding hourly pay of primary school teachers 
with a degree prevailing in 2014 (accounting for equivalent working hours annually). This 
would be a 76% pay rise on the current £10.70 hourly rate for this level of qualification in 
existing commercial facilities. In order to preserve the scale of relative pay levels between 
qualifications, the model assumes that each level of qualification receives the same 76% rise 
on their current pay. Therefore in a scenario of higher qualification levels, less qualified staff 
(level 3) would be paid £14.06 an hour, well above the median wage rate of all UK 
employees, which was £11.61 in 2014. 
 
The other staff-related cost elements to take into account are: 
‐ provision for sickness and holiday to replace absent staff, estimated at 10% of contact 
time in current facilities (assumed throughout all scenarios of the model); 
‐ provision for pension contributions at 14.1% of gross salary5 and employer’s social 
security contributions (National Insurance); 
‐ provision for training costs (initial and recurring), on average set at 1% of gross pay in 
current facilities. The model uses similar figures for the scenario of current 
qualifications but requires a boost to 1.8% of gross pay in the high-qualification 
option in order to fund initial degree-level training to 45% of staff.6 
 
Overheads 
 
Overheads are based on existing (current) non-staff cost in commercial and voluntary 
settings, found to be around 28% and 23% of total costs respectively (Department for 
Education, 2015). In the new universal setting, overhead costs include provision for 
repayment mortgage (for acquiring or constructing the actual buildings) at 2% APR over 25 
years.7 We assume overhead costs to be fixed across scenarios and set at 25% of total costs of 
                                                            
5 Current commercial settings (as well as voluntary) offer on average a 1% pension contribution for salaries 
above £10,000. The model of universal provision instead assumes contributions to be equivalent to those found 
in the public sector, at 14.1% of gross salary. 
6 Calculated as follows: a three-year training to get a qualified teacher degree costs about £21,000 (Allen et al., 
2016), that is £7000 per year (in 2014 prices). This is equal to 36% of the current annual pay of Level 6 
childcare workers (=£19,474 = 10.70 x 35 x 52). If we spread that cost over say 20 years of career (meaning 
only a twentieth of staff needs new training each year) and for only 45% of them (the higher qualification level 
to be considered), then the percentage of gross salary to be earmarked per year is 36%/20*0.45 = 0.81%, which 
is added to current level of on-the-job training provision at 1% of gross salary. Obviously if the qualified staff is 
paid at the higher wage, the training cost would be a lower proportion of their annual pay but the percentage is 
not adjusted in the model. The overestimation is negligible (about 0.3% of total annual investment). 
7 A typical basic primary school building costs about £500,000 for 50 children (assuming strict proportionality 
to a full primary school establishment, based on Talbot et al., 2013). At 2% APR over 25 years, the annual 
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current commercial settings of equivalent capacity/provision. This is about £100,000 per 
facility per year. 
 
Overall costing for different scenarios 
 
With all this data at hand, the calculations of total cost per facility are as follows: 
1) Multiply the number of children in each age group by contact hours per week  (i.e. 
offered provision) to obtain total contact hours per week per age group 
2) Divide this by respective child/staff ratios to obtain the total number of staff contact 
hours per week per age group. 
3) Multiply staff contact hours by additional non-contact time (16% non-contact hours 
for admin and special cases + 10% sickness/holiday cover) to get total staff time per 
week per age group. 
4) Divide this number by the full-time working hours of each staff member per week to 
obtain the number of staff (FTE) per age group needed in the facility to run the place 
during opening hours 
5) Add total FTE staff across age groups and multiply by number of opening/covered 
weeks 
6) In parallel, multiply hourly pay of each qualification level by the number of hours per 
week and weeks per year the staff is paid to obtain annual pay for staff members at 
each qualification level. 
7) Multiply annual pay by on-costs provision for pension, NIC and training costs for 
each qualification level. 
8) Multiply the proportion of each qualification level in the chosen facility (current or 
universal) by the annual staff cost of each qualification level and then by the total 
number of staff (obtained in step 5) to obtain the facility’s total annual staff cost. 
9) Add overhead cost to staff cost to obtain total facility cost per annum 
10) Multiply total cost by the number of facilities needed in the UK, to obtain total annual 
gross investment 
 
All scenarios assume universal enrolment capacity at 40h a week for 48 weeks a year. Only 
the level of pay, qualification mix and child/staff ratios are made to vary. As for the other 
cost parameters (overheads, non-contact time, training, pension contributions etc.), they are 
also fixed at the levels previously described. Table 3 shows the total gross annual investment 
of providing universal childcare according to these different scenarios. 
 
Varying the qualification mix does not affect total costs much (comparing scenarios 1 and 3). 
The main impact on total costs arises from the other two variables – pay scales and child/staff 
ratios. This is expected given the labour intensive nature of the service. 
                                                            
repayment would be £25,358 which is about 7% of the estimated total cost for a commercial facility in our 
model. Government calculations on the other hand estimate that rent and mortgage repayment of existing 
commercial facilities surveyed only constitute 5% of total costs. Since some new centres will make use of 
existing facilities in primary schools, it is likely to be lower than 7% so we have retained the 5% rate for estate 
costs as more relevant. 
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Table 3 Gross annual investment of universal childcare for different scenarios 
  
Child/staff 
ratios
Pay scale Qualification 
Level
Gross investment 
 (£m) (% GDP)
Scenario 1 current current current 31,610 1.7%
Scenario 2 statutory current high 29,289 1.6%
Scenario 3 current current high 34,697 1.9%
Scenario 4 statutory teacher high 47,211 2.6%
Scenario 5 current teacher high 56,931 3.1%
Note: See Table 1 for details of child/staff ratios and Table 2 for details of pay scales and qualification levels. 
 
The initial gross investment needed appears very high.8 It contrasts with current levels of 
public subsidies at around £5bn a year (0.27% of GDP) and to a rough estimate of £4bn a 
year spent by families out of pocket.9 The latter two figures obviously reflect lower use of 
childcare compared to a universal provision. If all families with children under 5 were using 
existing (commercial or voluntary) provision the total cost would be close to that of scenario 
1. The unpaid contribution by grandparents is not negligible either. The insurance company 
RIAS estimated that the unpaid contribution of grandparents to providing care to their 
grandchildren amounted to about £17bn a year in 2014, with 9.1 million grandparents 
providing at least one hour of childcare per week, for an average of 9.1 hours per week 
(RIAS, 2014).  
 
Labour demand effects 
 
The main immediate employment effect is to create jobs in the childcare sector. A number of 
childcare workers already exist so the model assumes that all their jobs would simply be 
replaced by jobs with the same characteristics as those of the newly created jobs under each 
of the scenarios considered.10 
  
In all scenarios the profile of the childcare worker is similar in terms of number of hours 
worked per week (all on 35 hours in the universal provision as well as current provision on 
average) for 52 weeks of pay. So the number of direct (full-time equivalent) jobs created will 
                                                            
8 Note also that it represents the total annual cost of providing for all children, not the additional cost on top of 
existing provision as it aims to replace the existing system entirely. 
9 It is difficult to estimate the amount spent privately on childcare as very few sources have reliable data. The 
2014 microdata from the Living Cost and Food Survey records expenditure on childcare for families with a 
child under 5 (the estimate is £3.8bn a year based on a 52-week payment scheme, but it is not clear whether this 
is gross or net of public transfers in the form of employer vouchers and tax credits). The same goes for the 
Department of Education’s Childcare and Early Years Survey of Parents 2014-15 from which we can estimate a 
figure of £4bn a year spent by parents on children aged under 5, again possibly gross of tax credits and childcare 
vouchers (Department for Education, 2016). 
10 However some of the existing jobs are for childcare provided to older children in after-school settings so not 
all existing jobs will be overhauled in practice but the model ignores this and overhauls them all as it is difficult 
to isolate the proportion of time spent by childcare workers on childcare delivered to older children only. 
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only depend on the parameters of child/staff ratios.11 The explanation of the method will 
focus on two scenarios (scenarios 3 and 5 in Table 3) that differ according to the level of pay, 
one of the main determinants of the effects of such investment in the wider economy. 
 
Indeed direct employment is not the only employment effect to consider. An indirect effect 
stems from employment created through increased demand for inputs from other sectors into 
the additional childcare services (food, construction, transport, etc.). One method of 
estimating such effects is by using input-output tables (Antonopoulos et al., 2011; Ilkkaraçan 
et al., 2015; De Henau et al., 2016). The ONS provides estimates of such indirect effects 
using input-output data for 2010, for different industries of the UK economy; in particular it 
provides figures of the indirect employment multipliers of each industry (also called Type I 
multipliers). For example, the 2010 education industry multiplier was 1.17. This means that 
for every 1000 jobs created directly from investment in education, 170 jobs are created in the 
wider economy through indirect effects on employment in the industries supplying inputs to 
the education sector (and input-output tables can be used to identify the number of jobs 
created in each of these other industries). 
 
In the 2010 ONS input-output tables, the social care work industry which includes non-
educational childcare services had a Type I employment multiplier of 2.76 (for non-market 
activities, that is, those that are provided publicly). However, given the structure of care 
services (mainly procured from private providers), it is not clear what this multiplier would 
be if the care provision was fully integrated within the public sector, that is publicly funded 
and delivered. In comparison, private sector care services activities (childcare and social care 
combined) had a much lower multiplier of 1.34. Ilkkaraçan et al. (2015) also point to an 
aggregation problem of using the social care industry to calculate the multiplier of the 
childcare sector, given the difference between the resources needed for long-term adult care 
and childcare. They construct their own synthetic childcare industry based on their own 
survey of the industry’s cost structure. This model instead adopts the multiplier of the 
education industry given that the profile of the new system of universal childcare with higher 
qualifications will tend to resemble the pre-primary education system. However the education 
industry is not sub-divided into pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary levels in the 
input-output tables, so we use the overall education sector multiplier of 1.17, bearing in mind 
that it could suffer aggregation bias. 
 
In the cost calculations above, I have assumed that total care costings include the 25% non-
staff costs (overheads), which are fixed regardless of the pay rise of childcare staff in other 
scenarios. These overheads reflect the indirect uses needed for producing childcare. In the 
Education industry of the input-output table, 25% of the total output of the education sector is 
made of intermediate inputs. So (at least on aggregate) the assumption of using the multiplier 
for the education sector as a whole is not implausible.12 
                                                            
11 It would also be related to the number of hours of childcare offered but these do not vary in the selected 
scenarios. 
12 By fixing the overhead at a level that reflects current costs, regardless of the rise in staff costs stemming from 
higher qualification and/or higher pay in the other scenarios, it is assumed that input to the childcare industry are 
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A second type of employment multiplier is the induced impact on aggregate demand (also 
known as Type II multiplier), stemming from an increase in consumption by the newly 
employed population (from both direct and indirect effects). Estimates of such a multiplier 
were obtained using a method developed by the Scottish Government (2015), and applied in 
De Henau et al. (2016). The magnitude of the induced effects will mainly depend on the level 
of pay received by childcare staff, since indirect job creation is relatively small given the low 
Type I multiplier. If their pay scale is on par with primary school teachers as per scenario 5, 
then it is reasonable to assume that Type II multipliers found for the education industry can 
be used. However for scenario 3, with childcare jobs still paid at current levels found in the 
childcare sector after the reform (by level of qualification) it is difficult to assume that the 
same effect on consumption can be obtained. Therefore induced effects closer to those 
observed in the social care sector are considered instead.  
 
Table 4 summarises the various employment effects for both scenarios (scenario 3 at current 
pay scale and scenario 5 at teacher pay scale). The Type II multiplier used in the teacher pay 
scenario (scenario 5) is 1.48 and that used in the current pay scale scenario (scenario 3) is 
1.34. Employment figures are in full-time equivalent. Table 4 also shows the gendered 
composition of the new jobs, reflecting the current gender segregation pattern of industries. 
The bottom of the table shows the change in employment rate, overall and by gender, for 
each scenario as well as the change in the gender employment gap between men’s 
employment rate and women’s employment rate (all aged 16-64). 
 
Between 1.5 million and 1.7 million additional FTE jobs could be created from investing in 
universal childcare, of which 1.1 million in the childcare industry itself.13 The model keeps 
the existing share of women in the childcare industry (98%) when allocating the new jobs to 
men and women. A more sophisticated model could be devised to allocate jobs more 
precisely, for example by matching characteristics of jobs to suitable candidates among the 
pool of ‘employable’ people (see below). Since our focus is on aggregate effects rather than 
distributional effects, we opted for a simpler model and assumed the status quo in the 
characteristics of potential candidates. 
 
Overall female employment rate (aged 16-64) in 2014 was 68% in headcount and 53% in 
FTE (based on female full-time hours). Depending on the pay scenario and if existing 
industrial gender segregation remains then female employment rates would rise by between 
6.1 and 6.5 percentage points. This would nearly halve the ten-point headcount employment 
                                                            
not a function of staff pay, that is food, electricity, toys and building maintenance do not become more 
expensive simply because the staff if better paid. 
13 These estimates are the net employment creation in childcare and other sectors, on top of existing childcare 
jobs and those existing in the wider economy to supply the sector and as a result of the consumption of the 
households of existing childcare workers. Rather than calculating the induced effects of increasing the wages of 
current childcare workers, we have removed their jobs entirely (and thus computed the indirect and induced 
effect of divesting from the current childcare industry) and replaced them by the brand new universal childcare 
system. 
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gap between all men and women aged 16-64 which has remained unchanged since 2009 
(ONS, 2017). 
 
 
Table 4 Number of new jobs created in childcare and more widely by pay level 
000s All Women Men % women 
Childcare 1,119 1,096 22 98% 
Other jobs (Scenario 3) 383 161 222 42% 
Other jobs (Scenario 5) 567 238 329 42% 
Total (Scenario 3) 1,502 1,257 245 84% 
Total (Scenario 5) 1,686 1,334 351 79% 
Employment rate 
change (ppt)  
Empl. gap 
change (ppt) 
Scenario 3 3.7% 6.1% 1.2% -4.9% 
Scenario 5 4.1% 6.5% 1.7% -4.8% 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
Labour supply and means-tested benefits 
 
As discussed above, boosting availability of high quality childcare is expected to free up time 
of the current unpaid carers of pre-school children allowing them to consider taking up paid 
employment or increase their working hours (substitution effect). It may also reduce the 
hours of those currently full-time who are only doing so in order to pay for childcare (income 
effect). The magnitude and net direction of this supply-side effect will depend on the number 
of unpaid carers whose time would be freed up relative to the number of jobs created in the 
childcare sector, and on the unpaid carers’ willingness and capacity to supply more or less 
labour. 
 
A more complete model of labour supply would be needed to estimate the composition of the 
new employable pool along with a job-matching model similar to those developed by the 
Levy Economics Institute for the analysis of investment in care that pairs up the 
characteristics of the new jobs with those of the expanded pool of employable people 
(Antonopoulos et al., 2011; Ilkkaracan et al., 2015). De Henau and Himmelweit (2016) 
explain the rationale and derive a method for doing so. Further developments of such a model 
would include joint estimations of childcare and employment decisions as designed by 
Vanleenhove (2013) and Kornstad and Thoresen (2007). This would allow the estimation of 
substituting existing formal and informal childcare arrangements for the new universal 
provision. However estimating the parameters of such a model for the UK is not 
straightforward given the current inexistence of a full-time free accessible childcare system. 
Using variations in childcare costs is the only way to derive sensitivities in employment and 
childcare choices but would not be able to account for quality improvement given the general 
suboptimal quality of existing services (especially staff pay). Instead our simplified model 
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calibrates potential behavioural effects on male and childless women’s behaviour as 
described below. 
 
Another issue to address is the existing interaction of childcare subsidies with the tax-benefit 
system. Because a large part of the current system of childcare state support is targeted at low 
income families, the (dis)incentive effects of means-tested benefits cannot be ignored, as 
discussed in De Henau (2017). A simple way to consider the effects of the tax-benefit system 
and childcare costs is to compare net gains of employment pre- and post-reform. On the basis 
that labour market candidates value financial incentives to some extent, they will want to 
know how much disposable income (after childcare costs) is gained by their household if they 
were to take up (full-time) employment as a proportion of the gross earnings gain before and 
after the reform. If the system guarantees access to childcare of high quality it is more likely 
that parents will be responsive to cost incentives rather than a combination of costs and 
quality preferences. If the financial gain is substantially larger after the reform, mothers are 
much more likely to supply their labour (given that fathers are largely insensitive to childcare 
provision), controlling for a given set of other characteristics such as their level of education, 
age and family composition and employment. 
 
Universal credit and families with young children 
 
The prime suspects of those expected to change their employment behaviour because of 
improved childcare options would be mothers with young children under primary-school age. 
In the UK, these mothers are also an important group attracting significant amounts of 
means-tested benefits (tax credits) as a result of not being (fully) employed and having 
children.14 One method to estimate the potential change in tax credits is to assess the 
likelihood that mothers of young children in low income households would take up the new 
jobs and estimate the new income of their family and the extent to which they would still 
qualify for some means-tested benefits. By aggregating the change in entitlements across all 
families affected, it is possible to estimate the change in total spending on social security 
benefits as a result of the reform, which would contribute to reduce the net cost of the 
childcare investment. 
 
Universal Credit (UC) is a means-tested cash benefit that is gradually being rolled-out to 
replace most existing working-age means-tested benefits, including the Child Tax Credit and 
the childcare element in the Working Tax Credit, both aimed at low income families with 
children. Under UC with average childcare costs, I showed in De Henau (2017) that for 
couple households with two pre-school-aged children in which one partner works full-time on 
median wages and the other is considering returning to work full-time (at the same wage rate 
as their partner), the net gain from employment after subsidised childcare costs are taken into 
account would be only 14% of the gross gain, while it would be 65% under free childcare 
                                                            
14 Estimations using the Family Resources Survey 2014‐15 show for example that half of families with children 
under 5 were entitled to receiving Universal Credit or the equivalent in legacy benefits. While 40% of these 
families included a mother not in employment, they attracted 71% of the total UC entitlement spending on 
families with pre‐school children. 
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provision. Returning to a part-time job would result in net gains of 23% and 63% 
respectively. So at median wages, there is definitely a stronger incentive to return to paid 
employment in a system of free childcare provision.  
 
Using the Landman Economics tax-benefit microsimulation model, we can assess the 
entitlement of all families with children under 5 pre and post-reform, not just of synthetic 
examples used in De Henau (2017). According to the 2014-15 Family Resources Survey data 
used by the Landman Economics model, about 40% of mothers with children under 5 were 
not in employment, 31% were working part-time and 29% were working full-time. 64% of 
lone mothers and 34% of partnered mothers were not in employment. This gives a full-time 
equivalent employment rate of about 45%, to be compared with full-time equivalent 
employment rates of 82% for childless women aged 25-34 and 84% for fathers of children 
aged under 5.15 
 
Finding the right comparison group (the counterfactual for those without childcare 
constraints) is nearly impossible given the singularities that each mother faced when making 
decisions about having children and remaining or moving into employment. However for this 
behavioural calibration exercise, which focuses on aggregate effects rather than distributional 
micro-economic effects of the reform, we have chosen as comparison group childless women 
aged 25-34 rather than fathers. Indeed they are likely to represent similar ‘employability’ 
characteristics to mothers of young children except for the fact that they don’t have childcare 
constraints.  
 
A few caveats of such calibration are worth mentioning: the reference group of childless 
women aged 25-34 is slightly younger and thus may face better employment opportunities 
than older mothers as their educational attainment has improved for example. On the other 
hand some currently childless women of that age may have a child in the near future and the 
focus here is not whether we can change existing mothers’ employment but whether a system 
of free universal childcare is likely to yield higher employment rates among future mothers of 
young children. Therefore using the employment pattern of this age group reflects the idea of 
pre-birth employment possibilities.  
 
Some mothers currently working full-time may no longer need to do so to pay for childcare 
and may reduce their hours to enjoy more time with their children; by contrast others may 
decide to work more to provide for increased children’s consumption and living standards, 
which they couldn’t or didn’t see the point of doing before the reform because of childcare 
costs wiping out any additional earning gain. These substitution and income effects may or 
may not cancel each other. Also, some mothers not currently in employment may have 
decided to raise their children at home regardless of the quality and attractiveness of a 
universal childcare system. We suspect the latter to be a minority as social norms have 
                                                            
15 Figures for fathers and childless women are taken from the Labour Force Survey (April 2014 to March 2015 
quarters). 
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evolved towards at least some involvement with the labour market, even with young children 
(Paull et al., 2002). 
 
Bearing that in mind, the pattern of true employment after reform for mothers of young 
children may still reflect slightly higher rate of non-employment and part-time employment 
than for the reference group of childless women aged 25-34. However it is also likely that 
childless women of childbearing age may have already adapted to a future pattern of care by 
opting for part-time employment. Adda et al. (2017) show that women anticipate the 
employment constraints of raising children (in the current system they are facing) while men 
do not. Given that fathers’ (full-time) employment rates are greater than childless women 
aged 25-34, it is reasonable to assume the latter group to represent a plausible employment 
calibration scenario in the absence of childcare constraints. In such a scenario, only 12.5% of 
mothers would remain without employment, 10% would work part-time and 77.5% would 
now work full-time, the respective figures found for childless women aged 25-34. 
 
As a result the simulated UC entitlement drastically changes for many of these families. In 
order to calculate the total UC entitlement in the new system and after mothers’ behavioural 
change, we have assumed a random allocation of jobs for mothers with young children in the 
absence of a parametric model discussed above. We have also given them a wage rate that 
suits scenarios 3 and 5 respectively. Table 4 above showed the number of jobs created in each 
scenario, with childcare jobs split 55-45 between less qualified, non-supervisory, and more 
qualified, supervisory jobs. As for the non-childcare jobs (indirect and induced effects), they 
are assumed to be paid at the median wage rate in the economy, which was £11.61 in 2014 
(ONS, 2014b). 
 
The assumptions used in the calculations are: 
 
‐ Scenario 3: the weighted average of the three wage rates is £9.60 and the simulation 
for this scenario assumes that 50% of jobs go to less qualified childcare paid at £8.01 
(in fact they represent 46% of the jobs) and the other 50% go to jobs paid at £11 
(which is between the wage rates of the other two groups of jobs at £10.70 and 
£11.60). 
‐ Scenario 5: the weighted average of the three rates is £15.10 (childcare staff are at 
much higher rates than in scenario 3, £14.10 and £18.80 respectively). However the 
simulation has retained that all jobs would be paid at £14 minimum (in part to reflect 
that the tax-benefit system is not linear in earnings). 
 
Within the current childcare system and take-up, total simulated UC entitlements of families 
with children under 5 would add up to £16,670 million a year (at 2014-15 prices), spread 
across 1.7 million recipient families.16 The post-reform situation with corresponding changes 
in employment patterns of these families as described above would reduce total spending in 
                                                            
16 The calculations use the Landman tax-benefit microsimulation model. It assumes full roll-out of UC by 2021 
with the characteristics as known in April 2017 and elements priced at 2014 levels. 
18 
 
simulated UC entitlements by £7 billion in Scenario 3, with 400,000 fewer recipient families. 
In scenario 5, the reduction would be by £8.8 billion, with 700,000 fewer recipient families.17 
 
Universal Credit and the unemployed 
 
This reduction in UC spending for families with young children only captures part of the 
potential effect on means-tested benefits. As only about 900,000 jobs will be taken up by 
these mothers if their employment rate reaches that of young childless women, this leaves a 
substantial number of additional jobs to fill. We have assumed that the next group most likely 
to take up the jobs (in childcare and other industries) are unemployed people without 
children. Being out of work but looking for a job, most of them are entitled to some social 
security benefits, mainly under UC (former job-seeker allowance and income support 
benefits). For childless unemployed people, only age and partnership status determine the 
amount they are entitled to (in the absence of any other source of income which we have 
assumed). If they were to take up jobs on a full-time basis and paid at the wage rates of each 
scenario, the amount of UC they would be entitled to would drop to zero. Implicitly both the 
Levy method and the macro-level allocation that we have just used assume that all jobs 
created will be assigned so we do not have to estimate whether these people are employable 
at all.18 Again because we are only interested in calculating changes in overall cash benefit 
spending, only the change in their entitlement matters and childless unemployed people are 
those with the lowest entitlement, hence the amount saved in UC spending could be 
considered as a lower bound. 
 
There were about 1 million unemployed people without children in 2014, about 45% in 
couple and 55% single. Any job taken on at least 30 hours a week at the lowest wage rate in 
either scenario above (£8 in scenario 3 and £14 in scenario 5) would no longer attract any UC 
for these people. The total reduction is therefore simply the number of those people moving 
into employment multiplied by their former entitlement. In scenario 5, the remaining jobs 
created account for three quarters of the number of people in that group. This would yield a 
further reduction in total UC spending of £3.6 million. In scenario 3, with fewer jobs created 
in total, the remainder accounts for 59% of that group, yielding a £2.8bn reduction in UC 
spending. 
 
Fiscal considerations 
 
Tax revenue from employment and consumption 
 
Given that all jobs created are assumed to be taken up one way or another, the results of the 
labour demand effects can be used to estimate the income tax revenue from additional 
                                                            
17 More details of amounts by family types and employment status are available from author upon request. 
18 Although in the Levy method, if some of them had very low propensities to be employed, other people in the 
rest of the employable pool (eg older unemployed parents) could take precedence. 
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earnings. This can be added to the reduced spending on UC calculated in the previous 
section. 
 
For childcare jobs, estimating the revenue raised by additional personal income tax and social 
security contributions (SSC) of employers and employees is straightforward since the jobs are 
assumed to be at a fixed wage rate determined in each scenario and on 35h full-time 
equivalent (which for the purpose of tax calculations will assume full-time jobs only). For 
non-childcare jobs, we have simply calculated income tax and SSC liabilities due on the 
mean annual earnings of all employees for each industry in which the jobs are created (the 
distribution of which can be identified using the input-output tables). A full matching model 
with individual wage estimation would give more accurate results individually although on 
aggregate, the tax intake may be similar. If anything, given the progressivity of the UK tax 
system, using average earnings underestimates income tax revenue for the Treasury as 
earnings above the mean increase the total tax intake proportionally more than those below 
the mean reduce it. 19 Additional annual direct tax and SSC revenue is estimated at £8.8bn in 
scenario 3 and £18.6bn in scenario 5. 
 
In order to calculate indirect tax revenue from household consumption expenditure (V.A.T. 
and excise duties), I have applied the average indirect tax incidence observed for non-retired 
households in the mid-range of incomes (quintiles 2, 3 and 4), using ONS data for the tax 
year 2014-15 (Table 4 of ONS, 2016): the average proportion of indirect tax paid out of gross 
household income across these quintiles is 12.3%.20 So we assume that any increase in gross 
income from the employment effects will attract a proportional 12.3% indirect tax revenue. 
This yields an extra £3.9bn in tax revenue in scenario 3 and £6.7bn in scenario 5. 21 
 
Net funding needs 
 
The total amount of tax revenue and reduced social security spending can be calculated from 
these different sources, including the amount currently spent on childcare subsidies (£5bn in 
2014-15). These sums can be deducted from the annual gross investment to derive a sense of 
‘short-term fiscal sustainability’, that is the net funding need that the investment will require 
from additional taxation or borrowing. 
 
Table 5 shows a summary of the estimation results for different scenarios with the remaining 
funding needs at the bottom. It shows that the ‘self-funding’ yield ranges from 75% in 
scenario 5 (the highest quality and best working conditions) to 83% in scenario 1 (with 
                                                            
19 Moreover, the number of jobs created in the wider economy is measured in full-time equivalent and so for the 
tax calculations it is assumed that the jobs are full-time. However the mean earnings are calculated across all 
jobs in each industry, not just full-time jobs, providing a lower estimate of the total income tax and SSC 
revenue. 
20 This is the most plausible simple assumption about the households in which those new jobs would be located 
in terms of income distribution. The indirect tax incidence varies between 14% in the 3rd decile group and 11% 
in the 8th decile group. 
21 Note that the calculations have taken into account the tax impact (direct and indirect tax) of existing childcare 
jobs and related jobs (indirect and induced) that were removed and replaced by the new system at higher wages. 
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current low qualification mix and low pay). Scenario 4 estimates the costings with the same 
pay and qualification parameters as in scenario 5 but for statutory child/staff ratios. This 
reduces the initial gross investment by about £10bn and the net funding needs by £2.7bn 
(though the self-funding rate is similar). 
 
Perhaps partly to reflect lower qualifications and pay, statutory requirements in the UK are 
actually quite high for European standards. A government audit of 15 OECD countries in 
2012 showed ratios for 2y olds averaging 1:6 in the Netherlands and Ireland and 1:8 in 
France (Department for Education, 2013). Denmark, Sweden and Germany do not have 
national statutory requirements for group facilities. The report stresses that France, Sweden 
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands require higher qualification levels than currently 
found in the UK. 
 
 
Table 5 Fiscal effects of different scenarios of universal childcare provision (2014 prices) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Parameters  
Child/staff ratio current statut. current statut. current
Pay level current current current teacher teacher
Qualific. level current high high high high
   
Costing (£m)  
Gross annual cost -31,606 -29,286 -34,692 -47,206 -56,924
(in % of GDP) -1.7% -1.6% -1.9% -2.6% -3.1%
Direct tax revenue 7,946 6,871 8,780 14,770 18,580
Indirect tax 
revenue 3,626 3,016 3,910 5,295 6,737
UC bill reduction 9,763 8,147 9,763 10,634 12,413
Current childcare 
funding 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
Net funding gap -5,271 -6,251 -7,239 -11,506 -14,195
(in % of GDP) -0.29% -0.34% -0.39% -0.63% -0.77%
% self-funding 83% 79% 79% 76% 75%
Source: own calculations. Note: ‘UC’ stands for Universal Credit 
 
 
Moreover the statutory requirement for 3-4y olds authorises a ratio that can go up to 13 
children per staff (rather than 8) if the facility has at least one childcare staff with a degree. 
Having only one graduate employee seems to be satisfactory according to the guidance. Thus 
keeping the ratio at 1:8 rather than the current 1:6 (for 3-4y) with 45% of staff holding a 
relevant degree could still be considered high quality. Therefore Scenario 4 could still be a 
high quality goalpost but less expensive in both gross and net terms than Scenario 5. It would 
however create 400,000 fewer jobs.  
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In any case, the net funding requirement remains substantial ranging between £6bn and 14bn. 
Funding the remainder is a political discussion. For example, the tax cuts afforded by the 
government since 2010 through raising the income tax thresholds above inflation and cutting 
and freezing alcohol and fuel duties are measures with doubtful effects on earnings and 
economic activity, given the stagnating productivity that accompanied the rise in employment 
(Houlder, 2014). Yet these policies costed the Exchequer close to £20bn annually by 2015, 
well above the £14bn funding requirement of the most ambitious scenario 5 (OBR, 2015). In 
an era of austerity with multiple confounding fiscal measures on consumption and investment 
(eg rise in VAT and benefit cuts), it is not clear (and under-researched) how the government 
can claim that such measures have boosted economic activity. The case is much clearer when 
it comes to direct public investment since the direct creation of jobs is undisputable. The 
other argument is one of investment in social infrastructure. Considering childcare provision 
effectively as infrastructure in the same way as broadband, wind farms and railways are 
physical infrastructure would in theory allow stricter orthodox governments to accept funding 
such programmes through public borrowing on the grounds that they provide public benefits 
over the longer term (Elson, 2017; De Henau et al., 2016). Even in a narrow sense, it is 
possible to estimate fiscal benefits of childcare by looking at gains in mothers’ lifetime 
earnings. 
 
Longitudinal fiscal effects from maternal employment 
 
A growing literature following on the footsteps of James Heckman’s work on the return on 
investment in early education, showed that public investment in good quality programmes of 
targeted childcare had positive net present values, with benefits outstripping costs due to 
reduced spending on welfare, crime and health, as well as increased employment and lifetime 
earnings for both the children themselves and their parents more immediately. A recent study 
by Heckman’s team found positive annual lifetime return on investment of public early 
education and care programmes targeted at disadvantaged children in North Carolina (Garcia 
et al, 2016). While a full-blown longitudinal model is beyond the scope of this analysis, it is 
possible to simulate some of the components of those effects, in particular the change in 
lifetime earnings of mothers as a result of the universal provision. A net present value method 
can be adopted for a typical mother on average earnings. The stream of benefits to be 
discounted are the annual additional fiscal revenue stemming from a reduction of the child-
related earning penalty observed for most mothers in the current system. The stream of costs 
to be discounted is the total cost of childcare over the years of coverage. If the former is at 
least equal to the latter, then the programme is deemed self-funding. We can actually 
calculate a break-even point in terms of the number of years needed for benefits to outstrip 
the costs and check that these are within the range of a typical working life.  
 
Using data from the Labour Force Survey, we can estimate average gender earning gaps for 
parents of two children as a proxy for the child-induced lifetime earning penalty (in real 
terms). Focusing on parents with two children in the age group 25-59, Table 6 shows the 
main parameters of earning differentials. The main benchmark group chosen is fathers of a 
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similar age.22 Table 6 shows that the gender earning gap among employees who are parents 
of two children is 45%, which accounts for differences in hourly pay and in weekly hours of 
paid work. However we are interested in the gap in average/lifetime earnings for all parents 
so we have to weigh these figures by the respective employment rate of fathers and mothers. 
Row (a) shows exactly this. Calculating the gender gap in mean earnings averaged across all 
parents equates to a measure of the gender lifetime gap that could be closed under a universal 
childcare system where childcare constraints are eliminated. If so then offsetting the total 
childcare costs for two children will take 8 years in scenario 5 of high quality, high-pay 
universal childcare. That is, it would take a minimum of 8 years for the Treasury to 
accumulate enough tax revenue stemming from changes in mothers’ labour supply that would 
pay for 8 years of childcare cost (4 years for each child).  
 
 
Table 6 Age-adjusted gender earning gaps of parents and fiscal amount recouped1 
 £ 
  
Fathers  Mothers  Gender 
gap 
No. years 
to break 
even
 Mean earnings of employees p.a. 35,762 19,804 45% 
 Employment rate 93.3% 72.8% 20.5 ppts 
(a) Mean earnings of all parents  33,380 14,425 57% 8
(b) 
Mean earnings of employed 
fathers vs all mothers 
35,762 14,425 60% 7
    
Women 
(25-39y) 
w/o chi
Mothers 
Gender 
gap 
No. years 
to break 
even
 Mean earnings of employees p.a. 30,413 19,804 35% 
 Employment rate 87.5% 72.8% 14.6 ppts 
(c) Mean earnings of all women  26,596 14,425 46% 13
(d) 
Mean earnings of FT employed 
childless women vs all mothers 
30,413 14,425 53% 10
Source: own calculations using 2014-15 Labour Force Survey (four quarters April 2014 to March 2015) 
1 Note: mothers in age group 25-59y. Age-adjusted earnings of fathers based on age group 23-57y 
 
 
The lower panel of Table 6 estimates an alternative benchmark based on women aged 25-39 
without children, as a proxy for earning and employment patterns of women before they have 
their first child.23 The break-even point shown in row (c) is higher using this benchmark but 
                                                            
22 However, since men become fathers on average two years later than women, keeping the same age group for 
both genders would yield slightly higher earnings for men that are simply the effect of their becoming fathers 
later. A quick fix to standardise age differences is to select fathers in the age group 23-57y instead of 25-59. 
Differences in earnings are small however. Similar points are raised in Costa Dias et al. (2017). 
23 We do so by projecting their earnings into later years from 40 to 59 using the average earnings of 35-39 as 
benchmark (we assume their earnings stay at that level afterwards, mirroring the male trajectory). Taking the 
observed average wages of childless women aged 25-59 would bias the results because many childless women 
aged 40 and above could actually be mothers whose children have grown up since LFS data do not record 
children who left the household. 
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remains within the range of most mothers’ potential working lives.24 However this is not a 
perfect comparator either because some of these women will have had their child at a very 
young age (and in the LFS data only dependent children present in the household are 
counted) or may anticipate having a child which affects their employment choices ex ante, as 
shown in Adda et al. (2017). Rows (b) and (d) offer alternative, less plausible scenarios by 
which the reference group is those in employment only, reflecting the possibility of a system 
in which only mothers in employment use childcare. Interpretation of results in (a) and (c) 
could be that all children attend childcare but not all their mothers are in paid employment. 
Therefore we assume here that mothers adopt the employment pattern of those without 
childcare constraints – fathers or childless women respectively – which reflects other reasons 
for not being in paid employment such as studying, incapacity or lack of suitable jobs). 
 
Table 7 shows the results of a more finely grained analysis by level of education. This is 
because education is a strong predictor of employment and earning prospects and the 
opportunity costs of having children varies greatly between women of different educational 
attainments. Low-educated mothers with two children face a gender employment rate gap 
that is twice the size of that faced by highly-educated mothers (29 points versus 15 points). 
Their average earnings, weighted by their employment rate, is 67% lower than that of their 
male counterparts. The gap is lower for highly-educated mothers though they still earn 51% 
less than their male counterparts on average. As a result it would take 8 years to recoup the 
childcare costs of their two children. It would take 9 years for those on mid-level of education 
(A-level or equivalent, i.e upper secondary school) and 11 years for low educated mothers. 
 
Table 7 Age-adjusted gender earning gap of parents with two children by level of education 
(25-59y)1 
£ 
Fathers  Mothers  Gender 
gap
No. years 
to break 
even 
Earnings low-educated 25,366 12,716 50%  
               mid-educated 31,951 14,632 54%  
               highly-educated 44,635 25,741 42%  
  
Empl. rate low-educated 88.4% 59.0% 29.4 ppts  
                  mid-educated 94.8% 77.3% 17.4 ppts  
                  highly-educated 96.5% 81.9% 14.6 ppts  
  
Weighted earn. low-educated 22,433 7,505 67% 11 
                          mid-educated 30,273 11,312 63% 9 
                          highly-educated 43,064 21,082 51% 8 
Source: own calculations using 2014-15 Labour Force Survey (four quarters April 2014 to March 2015). 
1 Note: Age-adjusted earnings of fathers taken from the group 23-57y 
 
 
                                                            
24 The average age of first-time mothers is 30 in the LFS data. 
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Conclusion 
 
While current childcare policy and future plans remain vastly inadequate to address the 
challenges of quality, accessibility and affordability of childcare in the UK, arguments around 
lack of funding were often the prime reason for opposing increased investment in the sector. 
The aim of this paper was to examine such claims and in doing so make a positive fiscal case. 
As the costings results show, investing in free universal childcare of the highest quality 
requires significant amount of annual spending, about ten times the amount of public 
spending on childcare committed by the government for the foreseeable future. Our results 
show that funding an ambitious childcare investment programme and sustaining it year on 
year is by no means unaffordable, even within the existing fiscal structure of the UK. Taking 
account of the tax revenue and reduced social security spending stemming from the many 
direct and indirect jobs created in the economy, only around £2.50 for every £10 spent would 
require additional funding on a year-on-year basis. The net funding requirement of up to 
£14bn a year remains below the tax give-aways afforded by the government since 2010 
despite an era of austerity, with effects on earnings and employment far less clear than those 
stemming from direct investment in social infrastructure. 
 
In any case results also show that over the longer-term fiscal benefits are likely to recoup the 
total investment in childcare, based on simulations of typical families (mothers with two 
children on average earnings). With different benchmarks of earning potential, our 
calculations have shown that again within the existing fiscal structure, the investment can 
reach break-even point in between 8 and 13 years, well within the range of common working 
lives after child birth. Such reduction in gender earning gaps is also another policy objective 
in its own right, improving women’s economic independence. Maternal employment could be 
greatly improved if the right incentives are provided and there is a genuine system of 
affordable, accessible and high-quality childcare. Moreover employment created in childcare 
and in the wider economy could disproportionately benefit women. Our calculations show 
that this would reduce overall gender employment gaps by almost half. 
 
However the main benefit of childcare remains that of investing in children’s well-being and 
social and cognitive development. There is also an economic case for this in that it would 
raise productivity in the future through better education, social skills and greater ability to 
adapt to fast-changing technology-driven labour markets. It would also reduce inequalities in 
life chances and offer opportunities to improve everyone’s quality of life as well as social 
cohesion. Both of these arguments justify public spending as these benefits have a public 
good element, the social infrastructure aspect of childcare. Quantifying long-term benefits for 
children and society more widely is more complicated but not impossible as Garcia et al. 
(2016) have shown. It is however beyond the scope of this study. Instead further more 
immediate research could focus on refining the job-matching model and the interaction of 
tax-benefits with labour supply decisions. It could also extend the modelling to examine 
changes in the means-tested social security benefits system to improve work incentives even 
within a new system of free childcare. 
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